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challenges  which  the  postulation  of  unconscious  cognition  faces  within  the  psychological 
community.
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“Knowing,”  in  short,  may,  for  aught  we  can  see  beforehand                                                 
to the contrary, be only one way of getting into fruitful relations 
with reality…. (James, 1904, p. 468)
IntroductIon
Contemporary  psychology  speaks  of  unconscious  knowledge  (also 
unconscious cognition, implicit knowledge/cognition, tacit knowledge) to 
refer to cases in which subjects display available knowledge to which 
they lack conscious access. While this is not controversy-free in psy-
chology, a significant part of the psychological community attributes 
to this claim a scientific status, contrary to what happens in the case of 
the psychoanalytical postulation of an unconscious mind. Part of this 
attribution of scientific status by a community that is not remarkable 
for being generous with this acknowledgement is due to the methodo-
logical approaches used by the diverse psychological disciplines: They 
all follow the strict rules of the scientific method. 
  Although the concept is still largely unknown outside the field 
of psychology, scientific hypotheses on unconscious knowledge have 
proven to be (and promise to be) extremely important in many fields 
involving  the  processing  of  knowledge.  Education,  medical  care, 
knowledge management, and consumer behaviour are examples of a 
few fields that already benefit (or will potentially  do so) from the find-
ings obtained from research into this particular subject matter. Despite 
the research being carried out in many psychological disciplines, the 
vast majority of the psychological community seems to have little or 
no knowledge of the subject as a whole. This is evidenced by the scanty 
or even absent referencing across the many fields that deal with the 
topic, as a glimpse of much of the recent work cited in this paper – with 
the exception of studies in implicit learning, implicit memory, prim-
ing, and anaesthesia, which display a fair amount of cross-referencing 
– will show. While it seems this is now slowly changing, with stud-
ies extending into other fields (see e.g., the study of Van der Kamp, 
Oudejans, & Savelsbergh, 2003, which puts into relation the dichotomy 
between implicit and explicit learning and the distinction vision for 
action vs. vision for perception), still there is no unified discipline of 
unconscious knowledge. This paper aims to provide a unified view of 
this discipline.  
  This  paper  does  not  approach  the  Freudian  dynamic  uncon-
scious extensively. The main reason for this is the lack of a consensus 
concerning its scientific status; this is certainly open to discussion, but 
this will not be undertaken here. However, a brief treatment of Freud’s 
influence in the field of studies on unconscious knowledge is manda-
tory. This survey does not include all the cases in which one can speak 
of unconscious knowledge; here, we discuss only those based on robust 
neurophysiological and/or behavioural observational evidence.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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unconscIous Knowledge:            
what, how dIstInct, and why? 
What?
In psycho-cognitive terms, knowledge can be defined as information 
or data about the environment (roughly: sensory input) that can be 
acquired, stored, and retrieved by living organisms with a more or 
less complex nervous system, with a view to securing their wellbeing. 
Cognition can be defined as the actual process of acquisition, storage, 
and retrieval of knowledge; cognition is therefore the skill of dealing 
with knowledge (Neisser, 1976). The two, knowledge and cognition, 
are thus easily confounded, the two terms being harmlessly – if not 
entirely correctly – interchanged in the field of cognitive psychology. 
In the case of humans, the information or data comprising knowledge 
can, in principle, be more or less expressible through verbal language, 
without the subject being necessarily or actually capable of doing so; 
infants, for instance, cannot express knowledge verbally, but we do 
not say that they are not cognitively active. Moreover, subjects may be 
completely unaware of a particular cognitive operation that is being 
carried out within them, and they may be unable to infer indirectly that 
such an activity is taking place because of a lack of overt behaviours. 
Thus, besides relying on direct verbal reports, we can assume the oc-
currence of a cognitive process based on a plethora of behaviours, overt 
or covert, that we believe indicate that a subject is acquiring, storing, 
or retrieving information. In other words, there are internal mental 
processes (representing, believing, learning, memorizing, etc.) taking 
place. In general, cognitive psychology reposes on these assumptions 
(cf. Neisser, 1967, 1976).     
  In the cases where subjects exhibit behaviours that indicate that 
they possess knowledge but seem both unaware of that possession 
and unable to verbalize it, we assume that they have unconscious, or 
implicit knowledge. More specifically, availability of knowledge in the 
absence of conscious accessibility is what mostly distinguishes uncon-
scious from conscious (also explicit) knowledge. Unconscious knowledge 
refers to knowledge that is revealed by task performance alone, sub-
jects being unaware that they are accessing it, whereas we speak of 
conscious knowledge when subjects are aware of possessing and access-
ing it (Schacter, 1992). A useful way of characterizing this epistemic 
availability in the face of conscious inaccessibility is by appealing to 
metaknowledge (e.g., Dienes & Perner, 2002): One can speak of un-
conscious knowledge when subjects lack metaknowledge concerning 
their own positive epistemic states, that is, states in which they po-
ssess knowledge. In other words, subjects cannot form a higher order 
representation about a lower order one. For instance, a subject with 
blindsight (see below) who, when forced to guess, correctly identifies a 
cross on a screen, has a lower order representation that there is a cross 
on the screen; however, this subject is incapable of representing this 
information to themselves with a higher order representation. That is, 
the subject cannot say, “I see a cross on the screen”; seeing the cross on 
the screen is not a conscious thought in this case (e.g., Rosenthal, 2005, 
p. 185). Returning to the availability-accessibility distinction, we can 
say that while the sight of a cross on a screen is available to the subject 
with blindsight, it is not consciously accessible to them.
  The claim is often stronger than this: Unconscious knowledge 
is not just knowledge that fails to reach consciousness or a higher 
order conscious thought. Unconscious knowledge is claimed to be 
qualitatively  different  from  conscious  knowledge  and  acquired  by 
means or cognitive pathways distinct from those that produce con-
scious knowledge (e.g., Greenwald, 1992; Reber, 1989, 1992a, 1992b; 
Schacter, 1992). Accordingly, we use experimental methods that can 
appropriately probe unconscious knowledge: Subjects are presented 
with stimuli that they cannot bring explicitly to consciousness but 
we can, nevertheless, show that they have cognitively processed those 
stimuli – that is, there has been unconscious perception, unconscious 
storage, and unconscious retrieval. In these experimental methods, 
subjects are unaware of the stimuli, because they are too weak, brief, 
complex, or are masked, etc. Other reasons are if the subjects are in a 
state of complete unconsciousness (sleep, coma, anaesthesia, etc.), if 
they cannot be conscious of certain kinds of stimuli (clinical condi-
tions, such as blindsight, hemineglect, prosopagnosia, etc.), or even 
because their attention has been diverted to another demanding task. 
  If  it  is  true  that,  in  principle,  unconscious  cognition  refers  to 
cognitive processing which takes place completely outside conscious-
ness (information is learned, stored, and recalled in an unconscious 
way, as in non-associative, associative, and motor forms of learning, 
for instance), it is nevertheless important to realize that knowledge 
acquired and stored in this way can be consciously retrieved (e.g., op-
erant conditioning). It is also important to recognize that a knowledge 
base which can be consciously accessible in principle (explicit memory) 
can be probed unconsciously (e.g., subliminal perception; see Sweatt, 
2003, p. 7, for a diagram capturing these distinctions). Although these 
distinctions should be kept in mind, we believe we are dealing with 
unconscious cognition: Again, what allows us to talk of unconscious 
knowledge is the fact that the subjects lack metaknowledge, in the 
sense that they are unable to specify how they acquired, or that they are 
accessing, portions of their knowledge bases. 
  Epistemologically, to speak of unconscious knowledge is to say 
that unconscious mental processes (e.g., beliefs, thoughts, etc.) yield 
knowledge,  which  makes  the  expression  simultaneously  superflu-
ous and erroneous: Whether yielded by conscious or by unconscious 
mental  processes,  knowledge  is,  of  course,  knowledge  simpliciter. 
Nevertheless, given that it seems that unconscious knowledge is to a 
great extent qualitatively different, we see no harm in using this expres-
sion, at least in situations in which one wishes to make clear that the 
knowledge one speaks of is processed by means of wholly or largely 
unconscious information processing.
  This ranges from basic perceptual processing to spontaneous 
problem solving, and the kinds of stimuli that prompt such processes 
range from low-intensity, brief, or masked physical stimuli to highly 
complex systems of rules (linguistic, social, cultural, etc.). Although 
verbal reports by subjects are much used in experimentation, one often 
has to focus on non-verbal behavioural responses, whether overt or 
covert; this is especially important when approaching unconscious AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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processes in situations involving clinical conditions, such as left visuo-
spatial neglect or blindsight, in which subjects report absence of aware-
ness of stimuli and therefore claim not to hold any beliefs or thoughts 
regarding them.   
How distinct?
Just how qualitatively different unconscious knowledge seems to be 
can be summarized as follows:
1. The feature that fundamentally distinguishes unconscious from 
conscious knowledge is the fact that the former appears to be purely 
procedural, while the latter seems declarative in nature. By procedural, 
we mean that this kind of knowledge is expressed in procedures or per-
formance alone, not being, in principle, verbalizable; in other words, 
subjects exhibit a dissociation between performance and reportability, 
being incapable of verbally expressing actions they perform and be-
haviour they display.1 Common examples of this kind of knowledge 
are riding a bike, speaking a language as a native speaker, judging faces, 
etc. However, the classification of unconscious knowledge can better 
be applied to other instances of behaviour without awareness, such as 
that displayed in the case of certain perception and cognition disorders 
in which it is hypothesized that subjects are in possession of specific 
knowledge while incapable of accessing it for neurological reasons (le-
sion, malformation, etc.). The procedural versus declarative distinction 
is also common in the field of research of memory due to the obvious 
connections between memory and knowledge (namely knowledge as 
a data base, e.g., Cohen & Squire, 1980; Squire, 1982, 1986), though 
further, higher distinctions commonly apply in the case of memory 
(see Figure 3). 
2. It appears that knowledge acquired and stored in an unconscious 
way is, when durable,2 more robust than that acquired in an explicit 
mode; a conclusion drawn from the finding that many unconscious 
kinds  of  knowledge  are  not  lost  in  amnesia  (e.g.,  Graf,  Squire,  & 
Mandler, 1984). This feature appeals to Jackson’s principle, according 
to which the degree of resistance of a mental function is directly related 
to its antiquity in a species; it is hypothesized that this robustness is 
accounted for by virtue of the precedence, in evolutionary terms, of 
unconscious learning modes (Reber, 1989, p. 232; 1992b, p. 109). 
3. This kind of knowledge appears to be holistic (vs. analytic) in 
that the knowledge representations are solely atomic, failing to distin-
guish the different components: For example, the representation of a 
rule or compositional structure such as P & Q is not decomposed in its 
constituents P and Q; it has no internal structure (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1988; Roberts & MacLeod, 1995). Given that this feature is somehow 
connected to linguistic aspects, this might better explain the proce-
dural nature of unconscious, non-verbalizable knowledge as compared 
to many other concurrent theories (see Roberts & MacLeod, 1995, p. 
300).
4. Routinized and inflexible seem also to be distinctive features of 
unconscious  knowledge,  with  performance  collapsing  when  altera-
tions are introduced in experimentally controlled tasks (e.g., Bayley, 
Frascino, & Squire, 2005). This might well be a reflection of the fact 
that this kind of knowledge appears to be tied to surface characteris-
tics (visual, auditory, etc.). For example, Berry and Broadbent (1988) 
found that if certain tasks (transport or person interaction tasks) were 
perceptually  similar,  transfer  of  performance  was  actually  verified; 
Reber (1969) showed a memory advantage when changing the letters 
in a grammar task while keeping the same grammar; Mathews and col-
leagues (1989) also reported good transfer with only a change of letters. 
However, “despite the surprising ability of subjects to transfer across 
domains,” as Dienes and Berry (1997) summarize it, “the knowledge is 
partly perceptually bound and transfer is not normally complete even 
when a simple mapping is known” (p. 8). Most importantly, this feature 
can also be accounted for by lack of conscious access in that knowledge 
bases which are accessible in a conscious way are subject to corruption 
due to a multitude of factors, as has been long known (see Bartlett, 
1932, and Loftus & Palmer, 1974, for two classical examples).   
5.  Predictably,  it  is  claimed  that  unconscious  knowledge  is  in-
dependent of explicit knowledge (e.g., Willingham & Nissen, 1989). 
Tulving (Tulving, 1985; Hayman & Tulving, 1989), in the context of 
research on memory, spoke of “stochastic independence” to express 
the probability that success in one measure is independent of whether 
there is success or failure in the other measure, the measures being of 
implicit and explicit memory. In the domain of unconscious learning, 
this independence was also verified; for instance, Berry and Broadbent 
(1984, 1987, 1988) reported that improvement of practice in perform-
ance is not accompanied by a similar improvement in verbalization. 
Again, this feature is in agreement with the overall procedural (vs. 
declarative) character of unconscious knowledge.
6. Other, more recent predictions, which have been tested only 
insufficiently or not at all, are that unconscious knowledge is age- and 
IQ-independent, and that it should show lower population variance 
(see Reber, 1992b). Despite the lack of robust experimental results, the 
above characteristics appear to support these predictions.
One important aspect to bear in mind is that these features were 
unveiled chiefly by research on very specific domains of unconscious 
cognition, dealing mainly with artificial grammar learning, control of 
complex systems, and sequence learning; that is, they are associated 
with implicit learning (see Artificial Grammars and Simulated Systems 
section).  However,  data  obtained  from  research  on  unconscious 
processes not immediately aiming at establishing cognitive features 
fits well into these findings, thus confirming the belief that all kinds 
of unconscious knowledge are essentially similar, at least at the deep-
est level (Reber, 1989, p. 219). More than a skill (that is, at a deeper 
level), procedural knowledge is a set of procedures, instructions, even 
algorithms, or just structures or patterns that are implementable rather 
than describable. Subjects act in a goal-directed and often skilled way 
without being aware that they do so, and, when probed, without be-
ing able to say what it is they draw on. This is commonly the case in 
habituation, in which irrelevant stimuli are increasingly ignored, but it 
can also be elicited by priming. For example, Lewicki and colleagues 
(Lewicki, Hoffman, & Czyzewska, 1987) primed subjects to locate a 
target following a complex and non-salient pattern, and Neumann 
(2000) led subjects to feel either guilt or anger by priming their attribu-
tion of emotions, something we in principle do without being aware of AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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relying on rules from our knowledge bases. Conditioning, classical or 
operant, is perhaps an even better way to elicit procedural knowledge. 
Here, the subject is basically unaware of the associations and responses 
established: In fact, we can, in a way, say that subjects unconsciously 
know the procedures, instructions, or rules (“if conditioned stimulus 
X is present, then produce conditioned response Y”; “if environmental 
cue S is present, then do R”) even when they are not aware of the whole 
situation. A good illustration of this is evaluative conditioning, or the 
conditioning of affective responses, which does not require awareness 
of the contingencies and often results in unconscious activation of goal 
pursuits (e.g., Custers & Aarts, 2005). Furthermore, this can in turn be 
connected with the holism vs. analyticity feature discussed. In the ex-
amples above, the subjects are not aware of the associations (represent-
able as P & Q) and response activations (P → Q). The subject is incapa-
ble of decomposing them into their constituents; namely, many results 
within both the complex systems paradigm (see Artificial Grammars 
and Simulated Systems section) and the somatic marker hypothesis 
(see The Somatic Marker Hypothesis section), in which subjects are 
confronted with situations of the kind “if P is the case, then do/expect/
don’t do/... Q”, can be accounted for by this feature. Regarding habitu-
ation, we can hypothesize that something similar takes place, with the 
subject being unconsciously instructed to ignore the presence of a 
stimulus (“if stimulus S is present, do R [= ignore S]”).
There is, nonetheless, one feature claimed by research on uncon-
scious cognition that does not seem to be applicable to all situations 
of unconscious knowledge, and that is abstractness (see Reber, 1969, 
1989). In fact, if such a feature seems to apply to the learning of rules, 
namely of the complex kind, it is not so in the case of mental repre-
sentations in other situations in which subjects display unconscious 
knowledge. For this reason, this feature has been omitted from the list 
above. Moreover, in the case of rule learning, as seen, the holistic, inde-
composable character of unconscious representations seems to explain 
better the reason why subjects cannot verbalize their knowledge. 
Why?
The postulation of a specifically unconscious kind of knowledge makes 
sense for many reasons. Firstly, it is quite clear that we are not aware of 
all percepts being simultaneously processed by our perceptive and cog-
nitive apparatus; at best, we are only conscious of one or a few percepts 
at a time. Nevertheless, we do not cease acting; we continue to respond 
to the environment in ways that show that we are knowledgeable of it. 
This is particularly so in the case of automatized actions, such as driv-
ing a vehicle or typing – situations in which one is not at all conscious 
of these specific actions and yet carries them out with the necessary ex-
pertise. To invoke these situations is, however, often a source of much 
criticism, which challenges theories of unconscious knowledge because 
they can be easily brought to consciousness, though they are difficult or 
even impossible to verbalize. This criticism is countered with other ex-
amples, such as speaking a mother language: Most native speakers of a 
language are incapable of saying how they speak the language and what 
rules they follow. However, they speak it correctly3 and fluently, and are 
very good at spotting mistakes. Given the early age of the learners and 
the absence of a formal strategy of learning, it is only plausible that this 
system of grammatical rules is learned unconsciously.
It also makes sense, from the evolutionary point of view, that if con-
sciousness is related to later developments in the human species – as 
it likely is, because apparently only animals possessing the neocortex4 
(the mammalians) seem to be capable of (self-) consciousness (e.g., 
Eccles, 1992), then an unconscious form of perceiving and learning 
must have preceded the first steps of human evolution. The hypothesis 
of a dual visual stream, discussed in detail below, supports this evo-
lutionary view. Humans with lesions in the conscious visual stream, 
the ventral stream, have to operate on a basis of data processed in an 
unconscious way by the dorsal stream, earlier in evolutionary terms 
(e.g., Milner, 1997). 
This equates with postulating that animals, like reptiles and fish, 
which do not have a neocortex or a homologous structure, also have 
knowledge, albeit only of the unconscious kind. This is only in accord 
with one of the principles of contemporary evolutionary theory, the 
principle of commonality, stating that evolutionary earlier functions 
and forms are present across species (see Reber, 1992b, pp. 112, 120). 
Besides the evolutionary meaning, this is another good reason for re-
ferring to unconscious knowledge, given that we might feel reluctant 
to attribute conscious knowledge to other animals, yet they appear to 
process information in a very successful way. 
Finally, we have many reasons to believe that humans begin to con-
struct their knowledge bases, if not in a pre-natal state, immediately 
post-birth and throughout early infancy. This is a stage of development 
in which mental life is thought to be, for the most part, unconscious 
(e.g., babies sleep most of the time; verbal language, apparently inti-
mately connected with consciousness – or some degrees/kinds of it, is 
mostly absent in early infancy, etc.; for studies in cognition involving 
pre-natal and early infancy development, see e.g., Fifer et al., 2010; 
Kisilevsky, Hains, Jacquet, Granier-Deferre, & Lecanuet, 2004; Tarullo, 
Balsam, & Fifer, 2010).  
hIstory and current theorIes    
and trends
History
Freud and the unconscious
Although the conception of an unconscious or, simply, of uncon-
scious mental processes, emerged long before Freud (e.g., Ellenberger, 
1970), contemporary research on unconscious knowledge is inevita-
bly connected to the Freudian unconscious, and it is thus essential to 
address this connection. To begin with, it is a connection that many 
contemporary experimental psychologists vigorously reject, and one 
that not a few contemporary practitioners and sympathizers of psy-
choanalysis seek to strengthen. If the former group see the postulation 
of the Freudian unconscious as lacking in scientific status (as far as the 
dynamic, or largely irrational and chaotic unconscious is concerned), 
the latter see the experimental results as corroborating and further de-
veloping the psychoanalytic theories (e.g., Davou, 2002; Ekstrom, 2004). AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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The rejection of the connection by contemporary psychologists is 
typically a leftover from behaviourism, which until recently dictated 
matters and methods in psychology. This is so much so that more often 
than not the term unconscious is altogether dropped in favour of the 
less charged implicit, or tacit (e.g., Schacter, 1992). However, the radical 
view that the dynamic unconscious is an altogether dispensable postu-
lation is probably more often and more vigorously advocated from out-
side psychology proper (e.g., O’Brien & Jureidini, 2002). In this field, 
it has frequently been acknowledged that the dynamic unconscious is 
not irrelevant to experimental psychology; on the contrary, it provides 
it with important theoretical material. Shevrin and Dickman (1980), 
for example, claimed that the tripartite dynamic characterization of the 
unconscious – psychological, active, and different in character from 
conscious processes – has been incorporated in many experimental 
studies. Based on this notion of unconscious mentation and on experi-
mental studies on selective attention, subliminal perception, and visual 
phenomena involving perceptual processing such as retinal image sta-
bilization and binocular rivalry, the authors conclude, against strong 
forms of behaviourism, that “behavior cannot be understood without 
taking consciousness into account and that conscious experience can-
not  be  fully  understood  without  taking  unconscious  psychological 
processes into account” (Shevrin & Dickman, 1980, p. 432).
Freud did not invent the wheel and much of his merit lies in having 
been able to put together many intuitions that abounded at the time 
he started his research in neurology. In fact, his development of a psy-
chology of the unconscious mirrors, in many ways, the “non-scientific” 
sources from which he directly or indirectly drew. For instance, one 
field in the 1800s in which unconscious (or somehow akin) processes 
of thought were being avidly researched was animal magnetism, and 
the methods applied were, among others, suggestion and hypnosis 
(e.g., de Faria, 1819/2005). The latter was precisely the first method 
used by Freud in his first wanderings into the realm of the unconscious, 
before developing more idiosyncratically dynamic techniques, such as 
dream analysis and free association. None of these was a scientifically 
recognized method of experimentation and research, but they were 
necessary to found a discipline that was above all an analysis of human 
psychical life with a view to therapeutic ends. 
This is not the place to defend the scientific status of the dynamic 
unconscious, nor is the aim here to sanitize it, but it is important to 
note that Freud did not always write of it in terms that can be judged by 
many as non-scientific. As a matter of fact, only late in his development 
did he speak in terms perhaps too vivid for more conservative minds. 
Here, he discussed the id, a somehow structural rough reformulation 
of his earlier topographic concept of the unconscious that greatly em-
phasized the “compulsive” (triebhaft) character of unconscious psychic 
contents after a reformulation of his theory of “drives” or “instinctual 
needs” (Triebe; cf. Freud, 1920/1961, 1923/1961).5 Then, he analogi-
cally spoke of the id as “a chaos, a cauldron of seething excitations” 
(Freud, 1933/1964, p. 73) and, less vividly but perhaps still in an overly 
unorthodox manner, “a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the 
instinctual needs subject to the observance of the pleasure principle” 
(p. 73). He had said something similar in earlier writings  in different 
terms (Freud, 1900/1958, 1915/1968), but it is in this later text that the 
wild and wholly irrational aspect of the unconscious is emphasized. 
This does not help Freud today:6 It is this aspect, together with other 
problematic issues (such as unconscious moral self-censorship and 
repression), that makes most opponents stick to their dismissal of 
the unconscious that Freud referred to as dynamic, that is, as bring-
ing about  an incessant state of psychic conflict between its irrational 
drives and the resistances of its conscious counterpart. However, in 
Freud (1940/1964), he offers a final development of a concept of the 
unconscious partly in terms that are manifestly not alien to those of 
some quarters of contemporary experimental psychology, as shall be-
come evident below:
We know what is meant by ideas “occurring” to one – thoughts that 
suddenly come into consciousness without one’s being aware of the 
steps that led to them, though they, too, must have been psychical 
acts. It can even happen that one arrives in this way at the solution 
of some difficult intellectual problem which has previously for a 
time baffled one’s efforts. All the complicated processes of selection, 
rejection and decision which occupied the interval were withdrawn 
from consciousness. We shall not be putting forward any new theo-
ry in saying that they were unconscious and perhaps, too, remained 
so. (Freud, 1940/1964, pp. 283-284)
This is what Freud called the descriptive unconscious, or the psychic 
content that is latent and only temporarily outside the grasp of con-
sciousness. Interestingly, this is a return to the more contained tone 
used by Freud in the formulation of the first topographical theory of 
the unconscious (Freud, 1915/1968). In addition, it suggests a sym-
biotic development of Freud’s concept of the unconscious and that of 
experimental psychology (see next section), more than perhaps a one-
sided influence regarding any of the two parts.
unconscious cognition From early 
experimental psychology to cognitive 
psychology
Before the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious was more 
clearly  elaborated  (Freud,  1900/1958),  scientific  psychology,  still 
in its beginnings, already showed an interest in unconscious proc-
esses: Hypnotism and suggestion, somnambulism and automatisms 
(e.g., Charcot, 1882; Janet, 1889; Sidis, 1898), as well as unconscious 
sensations and perception (e.g., Binet, 1896; Fechner, 1860; Peirce & 
Jastrow, 1884), were some of the most investigated and experimentally 
researched mental phenomena in the later decades of the 19th cen-
tury. However, the rise of behaviourism in American psychology soon 
banned these phenomena from the field of psychology, partially allow-
ing studies only on “behaviour without awareness”.7 Eventually, this 
gave origin to a whole industry of experimentation on mainly sublimi-
nal perception, or subception, which had also started in the late 1800s.8 
The basic hypothesis behind this research was – and still is – that we 
cannot equate discrimination with awareness, or, in other words, that 
much information is processed unconsciously, a conclusion reached al-
ready in the mid-1880s by Peirce and Jastrow (1884). In an experiment 
– in which they were the subjects – with extremely low differences in AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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the application of the same kind of stimulus (pressure by means of 
weights), they verified that though they would claim not to have felt the 
difference (they showed zero confidence), yet still they got it right in 
approximately 60% of the cases, that is, above chance. Their main point 
was that, having zero confidence, a subject would be expected to get it 
right as many times as they got it wrong (chance results). As subjects 
“guessed” correctly in 60% of the cases, it showed that there was indeed 
unconscious perception of the difference of stimuli – which, in turn, 
questioned Fechner’s (1860) absolute and difference thresholds, unless 
his notion of unconscious sensations was made clearer in the context of 
a theory of subliminal perception.9
  Experimental studies on subliminal perception were fundamen-
tal for contemporary psychology in that, at a time when unconscious 
processes  were  by  and  large  dismissed  from  serious  psychological 
research,  they  provided  abundant  data  and  formulated  important 
conclusions  that  helped  to  shape  today’s  approach  to  unconscious 
mentation. Soon after an important controversy regarding subliminal 
perception (Eriksen, 1956; Goldiamond, 1958; Lazarus, 1956; Lazarus 
& McCleary, 1951; for a review, see Dixon, 1971), Spence and Holland 
(1962) reported the paradoxical experimental result that awareness 
somehow restricts perception and cognition. In detail, they verified 
that (a) registration of stimuli is independent of awareness; (b) the ef-
fect of impoverished, that is, subliminal stimuli varies inversely with 
their intensity; (c) impoverished stimuli follow laws independent from 
those that rule conscious perception; (d) awareness of stimuli restricts 
their effect on recall of associated words. 
In face of these results, and in the wake of cognitive psychology, 
A. S. Reber (1967, 1969) opened up the path to research focusing ex-
plicitly on unconscious cognition; the now more cognitively directed 
assumption was – and still is – that often we do not know that we 
know. More recently, with advances in neurophysiology, other uncon-
scious processes were added to what is now a massive field of research, 
when the many diverse approaches are placed under the same ban-
ner. The next part of this paper describes the main results obtained in 
the different current approaches. The main selection criterion is the 
“knowledgeable” behaviour of subjects in contrast with their lack of 
metaknowledge (as defined above).
Current theories and trends
unconscious perception
It is impossible to speak of perception without appealing to virtually 
all aspects of psychology, as it involves the complex phenomenology 
that begins with a stimulus and encompasses various levels (physical, 
cognitive, affective, etc.) and factors (attention, motivation, etc.) of in-
formation processing. To speak of unconscious perception is even more 
problematic, because it is implied that not only can subjects receive/
discriminate a stimulus without awareness of that fact, but they can also 
process it in an unconscious way, in a kind of unconscious phenom-
enology. This goes against many robustly implanted and historically 
resistant philosophical and psychological assumptions (e.g., Brentano, 
1874/1973; Descartes, 1644/1983; Locke, 1690/1959). However, as seen 
in the previous section, scientific psychology questioned strongly this 
idea from its very beginnings. In fact, Fechner’s (1860) still confused 
notion of unconscious sensations and, later, Peirce and Jastrow’s (1884) 
conclusions on small differences in sensation, aimed to show that we 
can, and more often than not do, discriminate stimuli from the envi-
ronment in a wholly unconscious way. The data below on unconscious 
visual perception, as gathered from clinical conditions, such as blind-
sight, prosopagnosia, and left visuo-spatial neglect, strongly supports 
this. The fact that in experiments in masked priming subjects can 
process meaning shows that unconscious perception can take place at 
higher levels of processing and, in turn, data from studies in anaesthe-
sia and coma appear to corroborate the hypothesis that humans build 
and/or activate extensive parts of their knowledge bases in an entirely 
unconscious way.   
conscious versus unconscious visual pathways
It will be interesting to start this survey on contemporary theories 
of unconscious knowledge with neurocognitive approaches postulating 
cerebral correlates of conscious and unconscious cognitive processing, 
namely regarding vision. One of the most productive is the hypothesis 
of a dual visual system of parallel, normally interacting, but greatly in-
dependent functionally differentiated cortical pathways, one providing 
what has been termed vision for action, and the other responsible for 
vision for perception (e.g., Milner & Goodale, 2007). Anatomically, and 
sketchily, both streams start in the striate or primary visual cortex (V1); 
the ventral stream projects to the inferior temporal cortex and the dor-
sal stream to the posterior parietal cortex. It is further hypothesized 
that there are subcortical visual pathways to the dorsal stream that by-
pass V1 (e.g., Berman & Wurtz, 2008; Striemer, Chapman, & Goodale, 
2009), an important model to explain unconscious visual perception 
in the case of extensive damage or even absence of V1 (see Figure 1). 
In terms of function, it is thought that the dorsal stream is responsi-
ble for the use of information about objects (shape, size, orientation, 
motion, location) for guiding action, but not for their identification 
with a view to storage and recall in a knowledge base – the job of the 
ventral stream, thus justifying  the often used labels of “how”/“where” 
and “what” pathways for the dorsal and ventral streams, respectively. 
Strong evidence for this anatomico-functional distinction comes from 
specific dissociations in what might be seen, in general terms, as an ob-
ject versus action semantics dissociation (Hodges, Spatt, & Patterson, 
1999); for instance, patients with visual agnosia displaying skilful me-
chanical action, and patients with optic ataxia showing normal object 
identification. 
Of import for this survey is the fact that this anatomico-functional 
distinction  corresponds  to  a  segregation  between  conscious  and 
unconscious processing of visual stimuli. In fact, given the different 
objectives or outputs of each stream (the evolutionarily earlier dorsal 
stream guiding action and the more recent ventral stream working 
for perception), their processing takes place differently as far as con-
sciousness is concerned. Thus, because action does not require high-
frequency, fine-grained spatial representations of objects, but merely 
low-frequency metric data, it is claimed that the dorsal stream proc-
esses its visual input in a wholly unconscious way, whereas the ventral AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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stream requires some degree of consciousness (e.g., Bridgeman, 1992; 
Goodale  &  Milner,  1992;  Milner  &  Goodale,  2007).  Anatomically 
and functionally, this dissociation may also imply two distinct visual 
pathways to the limbic system, making for the ventral and dorsal vis-
uolimbic pathways, the latter being seen as implicated in the uncon-
scious emotional processing of stimuli of relevance for the individual 
(cf. Bauer, 1984, p. 464). Whether or not this is the case (see Breen, 
Caine, & Coltheart, 2000, for a rejection and alternative model), the 
colliculus-pulvinar pathway to the amygdala, a pathway that also pro-
vides visual input to the dorsal stream, seems to account for emotional 
responses to visual stimuli in the case of damage or absence of V1 
(e.g.,  Hamm  et  al.,  2003;  Morris,  Öhman,  &  Dolan,  1999;  see  Fi-
gure 1). 
  Within this framework of a dual visual system differentiated into 
conscious and unconscious pathways, the puzzling visual phenomena 
of blindsight, prosopagnosia, and left visuo-spatial neglect, which are 
all said to imply unconscious knowledge in the absence of conscious 
visual processing, appear to be attributable to the sparing of the dorsal 
in the damage or total destruction of the ventral stream (Milner, 1995) 
or, in the absence of striate cortex, to a subcortical colliculus-pulvinar 
visual pathway to the dorsal stream or to the amygdala (Johnson, 2005; 
Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). However, the reader should be aware that the 
model is not without challenges: For instance, it is argued that the need 
for the distinction between the two visual streams, ventral and dorsal, 
is not obvious or justified (e.g., Andersen, 2002; McFarland, 2002). In 
fact, functionally, the distinction is perhaps far from being as clear-cut 
as its supporters claim it to be. One can even go further to divide both 
or one of the streams, as Rizzolatti and Matelli (2003) do, which greatly 
complicates a model that seemed to be useful precisely because of its 
functional simplicity (the dorsal stream busies itself solely with guiding 
action, and the ventral stream works for perception alone). Against this 
criticism, recent studies continue to find evidence that seem to support 
the hypothesis of the anatomico-functional distinction (e.g., Almeida, 
Mahon, & Caramazza, 2010).  
Blindsight
Blindsight  (e.g.,  Cowey,  2004;  Weiskrantz,  1986;  Weiskrantz, 
Warrington, Sanders, & Marshall, 1974) is the ability of human indi-
viduals with scotomata (blind regions of the visual field) caused by 
damage to V1 to somehow discriminate visual stimuli. More specifi-
cally, when “forced” to guess, they can distinguish shapes, such as O 
and  X,  they  can  discriminate  line  orientations,  and  are  capable  of 
differentiating gratings from homogeneous fields. These are feats that 
are indeed perplexing, given that the patients claim either complete 
unawareness of the stimuli (blindsight Type I) or awareness of stimuli 
of a non-visual sort (blindsight Type II). Some of these feats include 
indicating accurately the location of stimuli and even differentiating 





























 Retino-geniculo-cortical pathway;   Retinotectal subcortical pathway 
Figure 1.
A model of unconscious (gray area) and conscious pathways of visual processing (not all possible connections are shown).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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  In cognitive terms, blindsight is a particularly interesting case, 
given that subjects with this impairment “guess” correctly well above 
chance, indicating cognitive processing of the stimuli presented. But 
this is behaviourally less interesting than the fact that a person with 
blindsight might actually be able to make appropriate grasping move-
ments towards objects presented in their blind field (Marcel, 1998) or 
navigate obstacles while moving in a room (de Gelder et al., 2008). In 
fact, this last phenomenon in particular compares favourably in behav-
ioural terms, because there is no task imposed or forced upon them by 
an observer. On the contrary, the patient detours the obstacles without 
any assistance, thus showing cognitive autonomy regarding the practi-
cal task of skilfully walking in the middle of encumbering obstacles, an 
everyday situation that often causes accidents for people with no visual 
deficits. Concerning the study of de Gelder and colleagues (2008), it 
is important to note that the patient in question has a complete blind 
visual field due to bilateral damage to the striate cortex that spares no 
portion of it. The aim of the study was precisely to assess the visual ca-
pacities in the absence of V1, thus implicating an entirely extra-striate 
pathway of visual processing. 
   It was more recently found that the cognitive states related to 
unconscious visual processing in blindsight might be of a higher level, 
involving the processing of meaning. In fact, Marcel (1998) found that 
patients were semantically biased to words presented in their blind 
fields. Also, by using conditioning techniques and covert responses, 
such  as  skin  conductance  responses  (SCR),  some  studies  (e.g.,  de 
Gelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 1999; Hamm et al., 2003) 
revealed that there is some processing, dubbed affective blindsight, of 
visual, emotionally charged stimuli (e.g., facial expressions) in blind-
sight patients. Again, an extra-striate pathway appears to account for 
this processing, namely the superior colliculus-pulvinar pathway to the 
amygdala, which is linked strongly to responses to emotional stimuli, 
especially to fear (de Gelder, Vroomen, & Pourtois, 2002; Liddell et 
al., 2005; see Figure 1). Although in this case no studies report more 
interactive, overt behaviour displayed by patients, the covert responses 
suggest that there is some form of cognitive processing with conse-
quent formation of beliefs and intentions that are not fully realized in 
behavioural terms.10 
  The main criticism against blindsight was launched by Campion 
and colleagues (Campion, Latto, & Smith, 1983). It comprised four 
main objections, one theoretical, and the other three  of a more meth-
odological character. In relation to the first, Campion and colleagues 
claimed that the use of forced-choice procedures is not compatible 
with the theory that the subjects are not conscious of the stimuli. 
Regarding the other three objections, the authors of the study suggest-
ed that blindsight is an effect of scattered light, spared cortex, and near 
threshold vision. Cowey (2004) attempts to address all these obstacles. 
More recently, Sahraie and colleagues (Sahraie, 2007; Sahraie et al., 
2006) have rekindled debate by reporting increased visual sensitivity 
in field defects after repeated stimulation (training). This might sug-
gest the existence of spared islands of conscious vision, namely spatial 
channels of processing. However, Ptito and Leh (2007) tested hemi-
spherectomized patients with blindsight whose occipital lobe had been 
entirely removed or disconnected (deafferented) from the rest of the 
brain. This  ruled out the existence of spared islands of visual cortex in 
the blind fields as an explanation for the presence of visual abilities (see 
also de Gelder et al., 2008). However, Cowey (2010) shows that the saga 
of blindsight is not yet over.
Prosopagnosia
Covert responses is all we have so far regarding prosopagnosia, 
the inability to recognize individual faces, namely those of spouses, 
close relatives, and friends, and even one’s own. Clinically, the condi-
tion seems to be well defined. It appears to be associated with bilateral 
lesions involving the central visual system in the mesial occipitotem-
poral  region  (Damásio,  1985; Damásio,  Tranel,  &  Damásio,  1990). 
The current trend is to see it as a memory impairment, namely the 
failure to activate memories relative to specific visual stimuli. In fact, 
prosopagnosia is often a specific inability within a more general failure 
to identify tokens of types of stimuli (e.g., clothes, fruits, vehicles, etc.) 
which the patients can recognize accurately (e.g., Damásio, 1985). The 
condition is not normally associated with a degradation of either other 
cognitive skills or complex visual abilities, except for a frequently ob-
served acquired achromatopsia (Damásio et al., 1990). 
  Cognitively interesting is the finding in the early 1980s that the 
failure to recognize consciously the faces of familiar people is accom-
panied by a covert emotional arousal (SCRs; e.g., Bauer, 1984; Tranel 
& Damásio, 1985; for a double dissociation with bilateral ventromedial 
frontal damage, see Tranel, Damásio, & Damásio, 1995). This suggests 
that an unconscious recognition indeed takes place. The sparing of 
a dorsal visuolimbic pathway in the impairment of a ventral one is 
hypothesized to account for this unconscious recognition (cf. Bauer, 
1984, p. 465).11 Although this may not appear to be so important in 
cognitive terms, these covert responses indicate successful matches 
between percepts and thus knowledge without awareness (Tranel & 
Damásio, 1985); experiments involving more directly observable be-
haviour would likely strengthen this interpretation. 
  Of direct interest for this survey is the rejection of a dorsal vis-
uolimbic pathway to explain the unconscious arousal verified in pa-
tients with prosopagnosia when shown faces of familiar people (e.g., 
Breen et al., 2000). However, neurophysiological studies appear to have 
so far supported Bauer’s (1984) distinction of two visual pathways that 
may somehow involve the limbic system (thought – controversially; 
e.g., Kötter & Stephan, 1997, to be responsible for emotional arousal), 
or parts of it, or simply limbic structures. For instance, Tranel and 
the Damásios (1995) found a dissociation between bilateral occipi-
totemporal and bilateral ventromedial damage: Whereas the former 
impairs recognition but allows SCR discrimination, the latter impedes 
SCRs in the recognition of the identity of familiar faces. However, the 
fact that there seems to be a specific hereditary or congenital kind 
of  prosopagnosia  without  apparent  brain  lesions  or  known 
malformations (Behrmann & Avidan, 2005; Grüter, Grüter, & Carbon, 
2008)  calls  for  more  research  into  this  condition,  namely  as  far
 as covert responses to faces suggesting unconscious recognition are 
concerned. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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left visuo-spatial neglect
Left visuo-spatial neglect12 is the failure to perceive the left visual 
side of space. Patients consistently neglect whatever item is on their 
left, leaving food on the left side of their plates, shaving or making-
up only the right side of the face, dressing only the right part of their 
bodies and wholly neglecting the left side of both their bodies and 
their clothes, writing only on the right side of a sheet of paper, etc. (cf. 
Halligan & Marshall, 1998, for abundant examples). Anatomically, left 
visuo-spatial neglect is associated with damage to the right hemisphere, 
specifically to inferior parts of the parietal lobe at the temporoparietal 
junction (e.g., Vallar, 2001), probably implicating the ventral stream 
(McIntosh et al., 2004; Schindler et al., 2004; but see Singh-Curry & 
Husain, 2009). That we can speak of left visuo-spatial neglect almost as a 
synonym for unilateral neglect is due to the rarity of neglect of the right 
visual side, attributed to compensatory or redundant processing of the 
right side of space by both cerebral hemispheres. 
  The  dubbing  of  the  condition  as  neglect,  however,  is  a  cause   
of annoyance to the patients, who claim that there is simply no left 
side of space (Halligan & Marshall, 1998, p. 358) and can thus be 
seen as anosognosics. In fact, and especially in cases involving other 
modalities, this failure to acknowledge the left side may go as far as a 
denial of ownership of one’s left part of the body (e.g., Cutting, 1978). 
Unsurprisingly, when asked to identify stimuli on the left side of space, 
they have very poor results, or fail completely. However, this is at 
odds with the fact that they perceive and process those stimuli, even 
at a semantic level. For instance, Berti and Rizzolatti (1992) reported 
facilitation of responses with semantic priming (highly congruent or 
congruent stimuli presented to the neglected field simultaneously with 
clearly perceived visual targets in the unaffected visual hemifield). In 
addition, showing semantic processing on a higher behavioural level 
(decision making), Marshall and Halligan (1988) reported that a pa-
tient with severe visual neglect consistently chose the line drawing of 
an intact house as compared to a line drawing she was simultaneously 
presented with of the same house with its left side on fire, though she 
claimed that the houses were identical.
  If we side with James (1904; see introductory quotation) in the 
belief  that  knowing  is  a  way  of  establishing  fruitful  relations  with 
reality, that is, knowledge is just successful behaviour, then the next 
finding is an example par excellence of unconscious knowledge. As 
already noted, obstacle avoidance when reaching for objects or mov-
ing in space requires good knowledge of the workspace. It has been 
reported (McIntosh et al., 2004) that patients with left visuo-spatial 
neglect, when asked to reach between obstacles they cannot discrimi-
nate,  take such obstacles into account in their trajectories. In contrast, 
when  asked  simply  to  point  midway  between  two  stimuli, 
their  performance  is  frankly  poor.  This  automatic  avoidance 
of obstacles is attributed to the dorsal stream, in this and other forms 
of visual agnosia (e.g., Rice et al., 2006; Schindler et al., 2004; Striemer 
et al., 2009). 
  Recent studies have challenged the localization of the lesions 
contributing to this condition, namely as far as the inferior parietal 
lobe is concerned (e.g., Husain & Rorden, 2003). As a matter of fact, 
it appears that it can be caused by lesions in many areas of the brain 
(Vallar, 2001; Vallar & Perani, 1986), which can explain the heteroge-
neity of the condition. 
perception under general anaesthesia and in coma
In  common,  general  anaesthesia  and  coma  have  the  apparent 
complete unresponsiveness to stimuli, namely the inability to wake up 
under stimulation. In both cases, the levels of arousal or wakefulness 
and of awareness are minimal or zero, and though we do not yet fully 
understand  them  in  anatomical,  neurochemical,  and  physiological 
terms, the similarities between the two states allow us to speak of gen-
eral anaesthesia as an induced and controlled coma (e.g., Bleck, 2002). 
Research into unconscious perception under anaesthesia and in coma 
states presents very practical objectives. The question as to whether 
patients  undergoing  surgery  under  general  anaesthesia  somehow 
cognitively process the surrounding environment (medical person-
nel speaking in the operating room, for instance) might be relevant in 
terms of the avoidance of traumatic experiences or, on the contrary, for 
the improvement of postoperative healing. As for cognitive processing 
in states of coma, it might help predict patient survival. However, the 
overall evidence in favour of cognition in states of anaesthesia was, un-
til recently, scarce or outright conflicting, which calls for more research 
(for reviews, see Andrade, 1995; Kihlstrom & Cork, 2007). The case of 
coma, for obvious reasons, is more difficult to study experimentally in 
terms of cognitive processing; perhaps the more secure results we have 
so far are based on event-related potentials (ERP; e.g., Daltrozzo et al., 
2009; further literature below).
general anaesthesia
Research in this particular field was sparked largely by a study 
(Levinson,  1965)  which  showed  that  patients  who  had  undergone 
surgery with general anaesthesia could remember, under hypnosis, a 
conversation among the medical personnel indicative of an anaesthetic 
crisis concerning them. Besides hypnosis, Levinson also provided sup-
port with electroencephalograms (EEG) recorded during the surgery 
that showed an augmentation of high-voltage slow waves coinciding 
with the anaesthetist’s words “Just a moment! I don’t like the patient’s 
colour. Much too blue. His (or her) lips are very blue. I’m going to give 
a little more oxygen.” This change in the EEG only subsided minutes af-
ter the tranquilizing final words “There, that’s better now. You can carry 
on with the operation” (Levinson, 1965, p. 544), and it was present in 
the EEGs of even those patients who did not recall the event under 
hypnosis.
Levinson reported the interesting finding that, 1 month after the 
operation,  under  hypnosis,  of  the  ten  patients  involved  in  the  ex-
periment, four repeated almost literally the anaesthetist’s words and 
another four vaguely remembered hearing someone talking – some 
of them were even capable of identifying the anaesthetist. Levinson’s 
experiment presents several methodological problems, not the least of 
which is the use of hypnosis. 
In fact, hypnosis, a highly variable and still-misunderstood phe-
nomenon (cf. Kihlstrom, 1985), was largely abandoned as a means to AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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test memory of an event occurring in a state also not fully understood 
(e.g., Evers & Crowder, 2009). More recently, the application of indi-
rect or implicit measures (de Houwer, 2006; Merikle & Reingold, 1992; 
Reingold  &  Merikle,  1988)  including  word-association  (Kihlstrom, 
Schacter, Cork, Hurt, & Behr, 1990), familiarity judgments (Jelicic, 
Bonke, De Roorde, & Bovill, 1992), and preference judgments (Block, 
Ghoneim,  Sum  Ping,  &  Ali,  1991)  helped  to  report  unconscious 
processing of stimuli presented during anaesthesia. In the first study 
(Kihlstrom et al., 1990), patients under anaesthesia were played several 
times (an average of 67 repetitions), through earphones, a list of 15 
paired associates (e.g., ocean-water). In the recovery room, when the 
patients were asked to respond to a cue with the first word that came 
to mind, they were more likely to produce the targeted response from 
the list, compared to targets of a control list. This result suggests that 
they had unconsciously perceived the stimuli, a conclusion further 
strengthened by the fact that the patients performed badly in a task 
of explicit recall (see below the Implicit Memory section). Jelicic and 
colleagues (1992) reported that patients who had been exposed to a 
list of fictitiously famous people were more likely than another group 
to designate more non-famous names as being famous, also suggest-
ing unconscious auditory perception and processing of the informa-
tion acquired. The study of Block and colleagues (Block et al., 1991) 
reported results that indicate not only that unconscious cognition takes 
place during anaesthesia, but also that this may be independent of the 
method of anaesthesia employed.
Despite these results, the phenomenon of perception during an-
aesthesia is strongly contested, not only because of the anti-intuitive 
nature of the theory, but also – and mainly – because of the lack of 
(more) robust results. As a matter of fact, other studies applying the 
same measures as those above failed to replicate their results (for re-
views, see Andrade, 1995; Caseley-Rondi, Merikle, & Bowers, 1994; 
Merikle & Daneman, 1996). 
coma
We  have  reason  to  believe  that  coma  is  characterized  by  total 
unresponsiveness to stimuli, both internal and external, as comatose 
patients show no evidence of awareness either of self or of the environ-
ment, remaining in an unvarying eyes-closed state even under intense 
stimulation. This, together with other neurophysiological measures, 
allows us to see coma as a state of absence of both arousal and aware-
ness, and thus as a radical dysfunction of consciousness (Posner, Saper, 
Schiff, & Plum, 2007). It is commonly caused by severe brain injury 
involving relatively discrete bilateral subcortical structures or diffuse 
injuries in both hemispheres to both subcortical and cortical structures 
(Schiff, 2007). It can evolve into either fast recovery or a plethora of 
highly dysfunctional states, such as vegetative state, locked-in syn-
drome, and even brain death (Laureys, Owen, & Schiff, 2004). 
  Given this clinical picture involving so many issues (medical, 
ethical, etc.), it is only legitimate that we should want to know whether 
there is any cognitive processing taking place in this condition, namely 
for prognostic ends. However, more than any other condition, this 
poses particularly difficult problems concerning measures of cognitive 
processing, as it is characterized as a state of no consciousness (Laureys 
et al., 2004). On the other hand, this makes it a privileged candidate for 
studies in unconscious knowledge, for, as consciousness is ruled out, 
any mentation taking place can be more securely considered uncon-
scious. Event-related brain potentials are believed to relate to psycho-
logical demands (attention, memory, etc.) invoked by a situation rather 
than merely reflecting brain activity strictly evoked by the presentation 
of a stimulus, that is, basic sensory processes (evoked potentials; e.g., 
Rugg & Coles, 1995). These ERPs provide an invaluable method to have 
a glimpse of higher mental processes in coma. For instance, Reuter and 
Linke (1989) recorded the P300, a late auditory ERP component, in 
coma patients who survived. This is a finding confirmed by subsequent 
studies (e.g., Gott, Rabinowicz, & de Giorgio, 1991). The components 
P300, and particularly N100 and mismatch negativity (MMN), a re-
sponse to a deviant stimulus in a series of regular stimuli, have been 
confirmed as reliable predictors of recovery from coma by a number of 
studies. This confirmation indicates that the evaluation of ERPs should 
be performed in the prognosis for the awakening of comatose patients 
(e.g., Luauté, Fischer, Adeleine, Morlet, & Boisson, 2005).
  Daltrozzo and colleagues have recently conducted an experimen-
tal study to evaluate cortical information processing in coma using 
ERPs (Daltrozzo et al., 2009). The study is particularly interesting for 
this survey, as it also concerns semantic processing and does so within 
the priming paradigm, thus having an immediate connection with the 
next section (see Masked Priming section). Briefly, semantic priming is 
the activation of the processing of the meaning of words by means of 
the presentation of stimuli, typically words (primes). In specific forms 
of  unconscious  semantic  priming,  the  primes  cannot  be  identified 
(e.g., they are masked; see next section for details). In Daltrozzo and 
colleagues’ (2009) study, the subjects were patients in acute non-trau-
matic coma with a Glasgow Coma State (GCS) < 9 (Teasdale & Jennett, 
1974). Daltrozzo and colleagues presented them with 120 word pairs 
(the word pair priming paradigm), 60 were semantically related and 60 
were unrelated, and 100 sentences (the sentence priming paradigm), 
50 with congruent and 50 with incongruent end words. Responders 
were found for both semantic paradigms (seven for the word pair para-
digm and three for the sentence paradigm) and their distribution was 
statistically different from that expected by chance. More specifically, 
the N400, a component of ERPs connected to the processing of mean-
ingful stimuli, was elicited in both paradigms by target words when 
semantic incongruity was involved, replicating findings in normal sub-
jects (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980), namely within the priming paradigm 
used in studies of unconscious perception (e.g., Kiefer, 2002). In light 
of these results, the authors questioned the assumption that high-level 
mental processes require explicit, conscious processing.
masked priming
One possible definition of priming is the activation, by means of 
sensory input, of stored information, making it more available to a 
person and thus influencing their perception and thought processes. 
When this influence is negative, actually inhibiting these processes 
in some way, as for instance in the Stroop interference effect, this is AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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called negative priming (see Tipper, 2001, for a review). In a typical 
experiment, two stimuli are presented successively, the target follow-
ing the prime. Take a disambiguation task, for instance, in which the 
word river (the prime) is presented before the word bank (the target).13 
We say there has been priming when the prime facilitates response to 
the target, in this case, when in reading the semantically ambiguous 
sentence, They stood by the bank, the subject interprets bank as riverside 
instead of as financial institution. Given that the prime is supposed to 
be unattended to, this phenomenon is particularly interesting for stu-
dies in unconscious cognition, being directly connected to experiments 
and theorizing on subliminal perception. This therefore provides a 
continuity between earlier experimental psychology (see Unconscious 
Cognition  from  Early  Experimental  Psychology  to  Cognitive 
Psychology section) and contemporary (neuro)cognitive research. As 
a matter of fact, we can say that it has contributed enormously to the 
current wider acceptance of unconscious perception, having propelled 
much fruitful debate concerning most aspects of unconscious menta-
tion (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007) and being especially connected to the 
topic of implicit memory (see Implicit Memory section).
  This is so because priming is theorized to occur in the absence of 
conscious perception of stimuli. More specifically, in the case of stimuli 
below certain thresholds – intensity, duration, etc. – it is thought to 
take place only on an unconscious level. While there are many prim-
ing methods, masked priming is particularly interesting. This is where 
typically a mask (commonly a string of symbols: e.g., “#####”; scram-
bled patterns, or letters; see Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2005, and Van 
Opstal, Reynvoet, & Verguts, 2005, for a debate on the importance of 
the type of mask) is presented immediately before the prime (forward 
masking), after it (backward masking), or simultaneously with it (simul-
taneous masking). This is an interesting method of testing unconscious 
perception because it is believed that it precludes conscious perception 
of the relationship between the prime and the target by masking the 
prime, that is, by wholly hindering its detection and recognition (e.g., 
Forster, Mohan, & Hector, 2003). Moreover, it can be applied to various 
stimulus-response situations, from visual (for reviews, see Ansorge, 
Francis, Herzog, & Öğmen, 2007; Breitmeyer, 2007) to auditory stimuli 
(Dupoux, de Gardelle, & Kouider, 2008; Kouider & Dupoux, 2005), 
eliciting processes ranging from motor responses to semantic repre-
sentations. It is thus not surprising that research into masked priming 
is an extensive and extremely active field, now developing into a large 
number of approaches and theories. These include the sensorimotor 
supremacy hypothesis (Ansorge, Neumann, Becker, Kälberer, & Cruse, 
2007),  masked  face  priming  (Henson,  Mouchlianitis,  Matthews,  & 
Kouider, 2008), event-related potentials in priming paradigms (Kiefer, 
2002; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006), the concept of direct parameter speci-
fication  (Ansorge  &  Neumann,  2005;  Neumann,  1990),  etc.  While 
response priming, involving motor responses, has long been a well 
accepted phenomenon, the results of semantic priming were recently 
questioned (e.g., Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001), making 
it a central point of debate within studies of unconscious knowledge for 
much of this decade. For this reason (as well as for lack of space) and 
especially because it is connected both to implicit memory (a topic dis-
cussed in this paper) and to unconscious processing of meaning, sug-
gesting that unconscious processing of information can be extended 
to higher levels of mental activity, this section will focus on masked 
semantic priming.
  The necessarily brief discussion will be restricted to a study that, 
though not recent, is still illustrative of the impact of masked semantic 
priming on the topic of unconscious knowledge, having moreover 
motivated much of the ongoing research. Inspired by clinical phenom-
ena, such as blindsight (see above) and deep dyslexia, in which there 
appears to be a dissociation between perceptual processing and the 
ability to verbalize and/or voluntarily use the results of that processing, 
A. J. Marcel carried out a set of five experiments with visual masked 
priming (Marcel, 1983a; see Marcel, 1983b, for a theoretical discus-
sion). These experiments aimed to counter what he called the identity 
assumption, according to which the representations of conscious ex-
perience are the same ones that are derived and used in sensory and 
motor processes. Of the five experiments, three (Experiments 3, 4, and 
5) are of particular interest for us, though they are all interconnected in 
some way. In Experiment 3, unconscious semantic (or at least lexical) 
processing was believed to have been verified when subjects identified 
manually colour patches that were either accompanied by or preceded 
by masked words. When the words were colour-incongruent, they de-
layed reaction time (RT), in a Stroop-like effect, whereas colour-con-
gruent words facilitated RT when pressing the button corresponding to 
the presented colour patch. Marcel drew some important conclusions 
from these results, the most important for us being that a masked 
word, which is not only unreportable but also undetectable, can be 
semantically represented.14 Experiment 4 was actually conceived to 
compare results between central pattern and peripheral energy mask-
ing. However, the result that interests us is whether RT (in deciding 
whether or not a string of letters is a word; a lexical-decision task) was 
speeded up if the (central pattern-)masked string was a word related in 
meaning (e.g., child-infant), a result that corroborates the conclusion 
of Experiment 3. With Experiment 5, Marcel verified that repeating 
a word-plus-mask from 1 to 20 times increased the association effect, 
whereas it had no effect on detectability or the semantic relatedness of 
forced guesses of the masked word, that is, “detectability and awareness 
could not be built up” (Marcel, 1983a, p. 229). This result goes against 
the argument that the priming effect depends merely on the amount of 
stimulus information required for awareness. According to Marcel, this 
suggested that while pattern masking leaves intact a representation me-
diating an accumulation of lexical and/or semantic priming, it does not 
leave intact anything that mediates accumulation of whatever it is that 
is necessary for a conscious representation; this rules out semantic acti-
vation, no matter how strong, as mediating consciousness. The results, 
especially of Experiments 3, 4, and 5, suggested to their conceiver that 
non-conscious representations should be investigated by looking at the 
way they influence behaviour rather than by asking subjects to under-
take the “phenomenally bizarre” (Marcel, 1983a, p. 212) task of selec-
tively using inaccessible representations. In other words, unconscious 
perceptual processing should be measured indirectly (Destrebecqz & 
Peigneux, 2005; see Coma section for further literature).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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Figure 2.
examples of Artificial grammars. grammar A originates the fol-
lowing strings: xmxrttvtm, vttvtrm, xmmxrvm, vtvtm, xxrvtm, 
etc. Adapted from “Unconscious Knowledge of Artificial gram-
mars is Applied strategically” by Z. dienes, g. t. M. Altmann, l. 
Kwann, and A. goode, 1995, Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, p. 1323; and from 
”transfer of syntactic structure in synthetic languages” by A. 
s. reber, 1969, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 81, p. 116 
(grammar A).
  In spite of the fact that a number of studies replicating all or some 
of the results of Marcel’s experiments immediately followed (Marcel, 
1983a, p. 232), criticism concerning methodological and theoretical 
issues was soon published, questioning the unconscious status of the 
unreportable  words  (Cheesman  &  Merikle,  1984;  Holender,  1986). 
This criticism prompted much research and the integration of stronger 
experimental techniques, from brain-imaging (Dehaene et al., 1998) 
to methods allowing an easier replication of the results (Draine & 
Greenwald, 1998). As was mentioned above, semantic priming had 
to face further and more recent challenges, particularly after stud-
ies conducted by Abrams and Greenwald (2000). They argued that 
masked primes are analysed mainly at the level of word parts and 
not as complete words, thus questioning the processing of meaning. 
Damian (2001) raised the fundamental question of whether semantic 
priming, instead of the unconscious semantic processing of subliminal 
information, merely reflects automatized stimulus-response mappings. 
These alternative explanations appear to have been reliably ruled out 
by recent studies (e.g., Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer & Brendel, 2006; Kiefer, 
Martens, Weisbrod, Hermle, & Spitzer, 2009), but the extent to which 
the processing involved is wholly unconscious, a concern that goes 
right to the heart of this topic, remains debatable (e.g., Kouider & 
Dehaene, 2007; Kouider & Dupoux, 2004).
    
unconscious learning and retrieval
The postulations of an unconscious or implicit memory system 
and of unconscious or implicit learning are not easily distinguishable: 
In general terms, implicit learning is the ability to acquire knowledge 
that is not reportable, or is only reportable with difficulty and im-
perfectly. Implicit memory is the memory that affects behaviour and 
judgements without the subject being able to intentionally recall it. In 
other words, implicit learning is the non-intentional and incidental ac-
quisition of information about structural relations between objects or 
events, whereas implicit memory is the non-intentional recourse to a 
prior learning episode in the performance of a more or less related task 
(cf. Buchner & Wippich, 1998; see also Dienes & Seth, 2010). In this 
context, unconscious knowledge is the information that is acquired 
in an unconscious way and/or stored in a memory system largely or 
completely inaccessible to consciousness. For instance, most people are 
incapable of describing most of the grammatical rules they use when 
speaking their native language, a particularly striking phenomenon in 
the case of very young (less than 5-6 years of age) fluent speakers not 
yet acquainted with any notions of grammar. A domain in which we 
often make use of unconscious knowledge is that of social psychol-
ogy. We can quickly (mis)judge people by drawing on often-quickly-
formed attitudes and stereotypes without being aware of that fact and 
even less so of the rules and constructs we apply in those instances 
(e.g., Downs & Lyons, 1991; Lewicki, 1986; for a review, see Steele & 
Morawski, 2002). Important paradigms in the field of implicit learning 
have been the use of artificial grammars, which is also applicable to 
research in implicit memory, namely in cases of impaired memory, and 
of simulated complex systems. Another approach of interest is learning 
during sleep.  
artificial grammars and simulated systems
Research into implicit learning with artificial grammars was initi-
ated by A. S. Reber in the late 1960s (Reber, 1967, 1969) and sparked 
an abundant literature on this phenomenon. This abundance reflects 
the complexity of the overall claim that, exposed to strings of sentences 
produced by artificial grammars (see Figure 2) without a learning strat-
egy, subjects actually acquire unconscious knowledge of the grammars. 
To support this claim, there is the finding that subjects in this experi-
mental paradigm can distinguish grammatical from non-grammatical 
strings well above chance, while showing no confidence regarding this 
skill and being incapable of verbalizing their knowledge of the gram-
mars:
When subjects said they were literally guessing, they were in fact 
performing significantly above chance with a classification per-
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did  not  know  that  they  knew.  Further  the  slope  of  the  regres-
sion line was non-significantly different from zero, F < 1. That is, 
subjects  did  not  know  when  they  were  in  different  knowledge 
states. On both these grounds, the knowledge is attitude implicit. 
(Dienes & Perner, 2003, p. 229)
Relevant to this paradigm is the fact that the grammars are too 
complex to be learned consciously even over a long period of time. In 
addition, they are not necessarily alphabet-based: For instance, shapes, 
colours, etc., can be used, namely in experimentation on transfer of 
unconscious knowledge across modalities (e.g., Altmann, Dienes, & 
Goode, 1995; Manza & Reber, 1997).
In addition, making use of complex rule systems and appealing to 
the capacity of subjects to acquire unconsciously knowledge of those 
systems, is the research initiated in the late 1970s by Broadbent and 
colleagues (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Broadbent, 1977; Broadbent & 
Aston, 1978; Broadbent, FitzGerald, & Broadbent, 1986). Their stud-
ies aim to show that correct performance on a control task (reach-
ing and maintaining specified target values by varying a single input 
variable)15 does not depend on the capacity of subjects to verbalize 
either knowledge of the systems they are asked to control or how they 
manage to control them successfully. Although the subjects’ perform-
ances improve with practice, this is not mirrored in an improvement 
in the capacity to answer questions about the workings of the system. 
Contrastingly, verbal instructions given to subjects improve their abil-
ity to answer questions, but have no import for their actual perform-
ance in controlling the systems. Given that this control, in requiring 
sustained performance, is carried out very much like a manual skill, 
this strongly corroborates the hypothesis that we physically act secur-
ing success in situations in which the sole knowledge we can make use 
of is of the unconscious kind.
  Perhaps more than any other field in which unconscious knowl-
edge is involved, experimentation with artificial grammars has faced 
important challenges; these date from its inception and continue today 
with certain regularity. This is not surprising, given that, as Dulany and 
colleagues (Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984) say: 
Nowhere is the claim for unconscious processes stronger, or more 
significant if true, than when the hypothetical processes are among 
the most complex of which we are capable – processes such as ab-
straction, inference, decision, and judgment. This is the claim for a 
fully psychological unconscious. (p. 541)
The first major challenges were launched by Dulany and colleagues 
(Dulany et al., 1984) and targeted the initial results obtained by Reber 
(1967,  1969,  1976),  as  well  as  further  developments  (e.g.,  Allen  & 
Reber,  1980). Though their experimental results roughly replicated 
Reber’s, they concluded that implicitly instructed subjects showed no 
more learning than those explicitly instructed; moreover, according to 
them, the learning verified in the former could be accounted for by 
the subjects’ consciously learning the rules, namely by acquiring corre-
lated grammars. A controversy ensued over methodology rather than 
over the distinction between conscious and unconscious knowledge 
(Brody, 1989; Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1985; Reber, Allen, & Regan, 
1985).
  However,  the  challenges  faced  by  the  theory  of  unconscious 
learning in relation to artificial grammars greatly stimulated its de-
velopment and polished the methods used for testing and measuring 
(for a review, see Destrebecqz & Peigneux, 2005). For instance, forced-
choice tasks appear to be well suited to elicit implicit knowledge (as 
compared to free reports and questionnaires). Important developments 
were the distinction and definition of objective and subjective thresholds 
(Cheesman & Merikle, 1984) and the devising of subjective measures, 
such as the guessing and the zero-correlation criteria (Dienes, 2007; 
Dienes et al., 1995). Briefly, perception is said to be under the subjective 
threshold when the subjects identify a target above chance performance 
while claiming not to have perceived it. We say that subjects are un-
der the objective threshold when identification is at chance level, from 
which it is concluded that the target was simply not perceived. It is 
when under the subjective threshold that we say that a subject lacks 
metaknowledge, that is, they do not know that they know. Subjective 
measures ask subjects to report their mental states, and not just to 
discriminate stimuli: They measure the extent to which subjects think 
they know (vs. how much they actually know). So far, two important 
criteria of subjective measures have been established: These correspond 
with two ways in which this lack of metaknowledge can be expressed 
and measured, the guessing criterion, measuring to what extent a sub-
ject’s belief that they are only guessing is contradicted by performance 
on a task, and the zero-correlation criterion, measuring the lack of a 
correlation between a subject’s confidence and accuracy in the tasks. 
In the first case, unconscious knowledge is claimed to account for the 
contradiction between the subject’s belief that they are merely guessing 
and the above-chance performance, and, in the second case, uncon-
scious knowledge is said to be demonstrated when subjects are equally 
confident in both accurate and inaccurate decisions.
  Research in the artificial grammars paradigm has more recently 
received contributions from ERP-based studies looking for neural cor-
relates of the cognitive demands involved (e.g., rule adherence, chunk 
formation, etc.) in unconscious grammar learning (e.g., Lieberman, 
Chang, Chiao, Bookheimer, & Knowlton, 2004; Skosnik et al., 2002). 
An interesting finding concerning neural correlates in the artificial 
grammar paradigm is a dissociation found by Seger and colleagues 
(Seger, Prabhakaran, Poldrack, & Gabrieli, 2000) between the neural 
bases of implicit and explicit learning. 
implicit memory
As seen, experimental psychology was, from its beginnings, very 
much interested in unconscious processes, but until recently, it failed to 
unite the fields of unconscious memory and unconscious learning. As 
a matter of fact, while the terminological distinction between implicit 
and explicit kinds of memory and knowledge dates from as early as the 
1920s (McDougall, 1924), talk of implicit learning began properly only 
with A. S. Reber in the late 1960s (Reber, 1967), though studies on un-
conscious learning processes had started long before this coinage (e.g., 
Thorndike & Rock, 1934). A few years after Reber’s first experiments 
with artificial grammars, psychology saw the explosion of a plethora of 
distinctions of memory systems (see Sherry & Schacter, 1987, p. 446), AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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of which only a few became more or less orthodox; in particular, the 
contemporary major distinction of the multiple memory systems ap-
proach (see Figure 3) is widely accepted. 
  This  distinction,  contrasting  declarative  vs.  non-declarative 
memory systems, is of clear interest for this survey in that it largely 
equates with the already known explicit versus implicit dichotomy, 
now applied to memory systems. It also incorporates elements of the 
widely-accepted distinction between semantic and episodic memory 
subsystems (Tulving, 1972) that might help to clarify the concept of de-
clarative in knowledge issues. Declarative memory, as the name implies, 
is memory that can be verbalized, hence brought to consciousness and 
explicit in the sense that one is aware of it. It is believed to comprise two 
subsystems, episodic memory, a storage system of events, and semantic 
memory, a storage system for words and concepts. As for non-declar-
ative memory, its main characteristic is that, contrary to declarative 
memory, it is not easily (if at all) verbalizable, remaining implicit and 
observable only in behaviour. According to this approach, it comprises 
subsystems  for  priming,  associative  learning,  and  non-associative 
learning, together with procedural memory, in this view, specifically 
reserved for skills and habits. Supporting this functional distinction are 
findings in neuropsychology indicating different cerebral localizations 
(e.g., Atallah, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2004; Bechara et al., 1995; McDonald 
& White, 1993).
An important study (Berry & Dienes, 1991; see Buchner & Wippich, 
1998, for a criticism and caveats) puts implicit memory and implicit 
learning into relation with respect to key features and underlying pro-
cesses. It concludes that, though independent to some extent, there is 
the possibility of a common field of research in that the same processes 
seem to underlie performance in tasks involving the two phenomena. 
In fact, they verified that, by and large, both implicit memory and un-
conscious learning/knowledge are (a) tied to the surface characteristics 
of stimuli, (b) more durable than their conscious counterparts, (c) less 
affected by variables manipulation of the level or type of study process-
ing, (d) partly stochastically independent (see Tulving, 1985) of their 
conscious counterparts, and (e) unaffected by amnesia.
  Key feature (e) is extremely important for the dichotomy at is-
sue in that it strongly corroborates the view that unconscious learning 
and implicit memory are indeed different phenomena from conscious 
learning and explicit memory, and not merely knowledge or memory 
that fails to reach consciousness, but could do so. Briefly, neurological 
amnesia, following lesions to the medial temporal and diencephalic 
regions of the brain in cases like head injury, anoxia, chronic alcohol 
abuse (Korsakoff amnesia), ischemia, etc., is the inability to remember 
past events and facts (retrograde  amnesia) and/or new information 
(anterograde amnesia) in the normal functioning of the other percep-
tual and cognitive faculties. This appears to indicate that amnesia is an 
impairment of explicit or declarative memory alone (see Figure 3). In 
fact, studies in amnesia have shown that, while amnesic patients are 
seriously impaired in tasks of explicit memory (recall, free or cued, and 


















(C and O 
conditioning) 
Procedural  



















the Multiple Memory systems Approach. “Associative” and “non-associative” refer to forms of learning. Adapted from “cognitive neu-
roscience and the study of Memory” by  B. Milner, l. r. squire, and e. r. Kandel, 1998, Neuron, 20, p. 451.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
http://www.ac-psych.org 2010 • volume 6 • 116-141 130
facts and events (e.g., Reed & Squire, 1998), they performed well in 
tasks involving implicit memory, such as repetition priming and skill 
learning (Graf et al., 1984).
  Concerning the first tasks, repetition priming is the facilitation 
in the processing of a stimulus owing to a recent encounter with that 
stimulus (see above). This facilitation is verified, for example, in de-
creased latencies in the making of lexical decisions and in a tendency 
to use words to which one has been exposed in tasks such as word com-
pletion. The study by Graf and colleagues (Graf et al., 1984), based on 
an activation account of memory,16 is of particular importance in that 
it contrasts results obtained by three kinds of amnesic patients in tasks 
of explicit and implicit memory. Whereas all patients in the study were 
clearly impaired by comparison to control subjects in tasks of explicit 
memory, they performed normally in a task of word completion. Tasks 
involving  skill  (motor  and  cognitive)  learning  in  amnesic  patients 
also appear to indicate that there is implicit learning in the absence 
of any conscious memory: For instance, amnesic patients have shown 
progresses in mirror-tracing tasks (Milner, 1962), and rule learning has 
been verified (Kinsbourne & Wood, 1975).
  None of the many studies in implicit memory in amnesia, how-
ever, shows in such a vivid way and in cognitive-behavioural terms that 
we can speak of an unconscious memory system as the “experiment” 
carried out by Claparède (1911/1995). He deliberately pricked a pro-
foundly amnesic patient with a pin hidden in his hand when shaking 
hands with her; following this event, the patient, albeit unable to con-
sciously remember it, refused to shake hands with him, claiming that it 
was well known that sometimes people hide pins in their hands. 
  For a long time, research in impaired memory has directly ap-
plied the artificial grammars paradigm with results that support the 
above.  For  instance,  we  have  known  for  some  time  that  amnesic 
patients perform normally in indirect measures of implicit grammar 
learning (e.g., Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, 1992). More recently, using 
this paradigm with patients with early Alzheimer’s disease, who often 
exhibit impaired declarative memory, Reber and colleagues (Reber, 
Martinez, & Weintraub, 2003) found evidence suggesting that implicit 
memory formation was intact.    
  This field of research is not without its challenges; inevitably, the 
main issue involves the possibility of confusing implicit with explicit 
memory, namely with involuntary explicit memory (see Schacter, 1987, 
p. 510). Contrary to research with artificial grammars, this field has not 
carried out a significant assessment of the methodology used in the ex-
periments, perhaps due to the fact that it has not sustained such vigor-
ous and repeated challenges as the former, though such challenges exist 
and call for such an assessment. For instance, Buchner and Wippich 
(2000) argue that a reliability difference (implicit memory tests com-
monly have low reliability vs. high reliability of explicit memory tests) 
might be behind the results suggesting a dissociation between the 
two kinds or systems of memory. One of the reasons for the lack of 
such active opposition as that encountered by research into implicit 
learning is that the theoretical distinction between implicit and explicit 
memory is not only apparently verified by experimental behavioural 
studies (again, see Buchner & Wippich, 2000), but also by physiologi-
cal approaches which strongly suggest that these memory systems are 
anatomically distinct (e.g., Buckner at al., 1995; Voss & Paller, 2007; cf. 
Figure 3). Moreover, the findings discussed above (that patients with 
impaired memory exhibit normal levels of performance in tasks of 
implicit memory) also support the distinction. 
learning during sleep
A long-standing interest in learning during sleep is due to the high 
degree of unresponsiveness in the otherwise apparently normally func-
tioning perceptive and cognitive apparatus:17 just how much cognition 
can actually take place in this state characterized by a reduction of 
exteroceptive stimulation? Learning during sleep is so appealing to so 
many that it has actually become a whole industry, namely in language 
learning.
However, the evidence in favour of cognition in states of sleep was 
for a long time scarce, barely impeding an outright dismissal (Aarons, 
1976). The stimuli presented in order to test the hypothesis of learning 
during sleep were of an auditory nature, for obvious reasons; recogni-
tion and recall (stimulated, unaided, guessing) were the most common 
testing  methods  (see  Aarons,  1976,  pp.  4-5).  As  said  earlier,  there 
was not much positive evidence18 and what scarce evidence did exist 
pointed to some learning coinciding with the appearance of alpha wave 
activations that occur more frequently during low-voltage EEG sleep, 
that is, rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, and thus closer to a state 
of wakefulness than to deep sleep (Aarons, 1976; Simon & Emmons, 
1956; Tani & Yoshii, 1970). The fact that many studies simply did not 
include EEGs also helped to discredit research in this field. 
More robust evidence suggesting that sensory stimuli are given 
some processing during sleep was possible with a more consistent neu-
rocognitive approach facilitated by theoretical and technical advances 
in brain imaging (for examples of earlier studies, see Antrobus, 1990; 
Kutas, 1990; for a recent review, see Ibáñez, Martín, Hurtado, & López, 
2009). More recently, studies in this line have included infants, due 
to the curious fact that, despite the long hours they spend sleeping, 
large amounts of learning appear to take place (e.g., Tarullo et al., 2010; 
Fifer et al., 2010). This research is in line with studies on memory con-
solidation during sleep (e.g., Brawn, Fenn, Nusbaum, & Margoliash, 
2008; Stickgold, 2005; Stickgold, Hobson, Fosse, & Fosse, 2001). This, 
however informative, should not replace the need for studies more di-
rectly – though using indirect measures! – testing knowledge acquired 
during sleep, even because our understanding regarding the neural 
correlates of information processing, conscious or unconscious, is far 
from robust. 
unconscious thinking and decision making
Decision making is of interest to studies in unconscious knowl-
edge for the behavioural aspects it presents: Is one always aware of 
one’s decisions? What unconscious factors determine decision mak-
ing? How do decisions taken unconsciously compare with conscious 
ones?;  etc.  Perhaps  better  than  any  other  behavioural  responses, 
decision making reflects the way information is gathered selectively 
and processed with a view to the wellbeing of the individual, as it AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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involves such complex issues as “rationality” and “logicality,” aspects 
that are more often than not explicitly equated with consciousness. 
However,  ongoing  research  into  this  topic  suggests  strongly  that 
“rational” and “logical” thinking, or processing of information con-
tained in a human knowledge base, can be carried out in a largely or 
wholly unconscious way: Both the somatic marker hypothesis and
unconscious  thought  theory,  without  directly  aiming  to  contribute 
to  a  theory  of  unconscious  knowledge,  offer  it  important
material. 
 
the somatic marker hypothesis
The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH; cf. e.g., Bechara & Damásio, 
2005; Damásio, 1996) is the scientific way of putting what in everyday 
language we call “gut feeling,” a sort of “embodied knowledge” we can-
not explain or specify but on which we are quite willing to ground our 
actions. As its name indicates, it postulates a crucial role to somatic 
states (emotional changes) in cognition, namely in decision making 
processes. In essence, it is the claim that cognitive states are associated 
with somatic changes that arise in bioregulatory processes, and that 
these associations, once stored in memory, are recalled in contexts sim-
ilar to the one in which they first occurred. More specifically, the SMH 
sees the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) as the area of the 
brain where an association – a dispositional marking – between factual 
knowledge and bioregulatory processes is cognitively processed, that 
is, learned and stored (Bechara, Damásio, & Damásio, 2000; Damásio, 
Tranel, & Damásio, 1991). This marking is dispositional in that, once 
established, a situation similar to the original situation in which the 
association was first formed triggers a disposition for the same type 
of emotion, which, however, does not necessarily reactivate the same 
somatic states (the body loop), more often than not actually bypassing 
the body (the as-if body loop). Damásio and colleagues hypothesize 
that patients with damage to the VMPFC are impaired in learning 
this association, namely in cases in which somatic states mark situa-
tions involving punishment and reward. In fact, the hypothesis arose 
from the observation that people with lesions in the VMPFC showed 
disruptions in social behaviour in the absence of any intellectual and 
cognitive  impairment.  This  disruption  was  especially  noticeable  in 
often-disastrous post-lesion decision making shown by the patients 
(cf. Damásio, 1994, for a full account of the famous case of Phineas 
Gage). 
  The main paradigm in the experimental study of this hypothe-
sis is the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damásio, Damásio, & 
Lee, 1999; see also Bechara, Damásio, Damásio, & Anderson, 1994). 
This is a card-selection task involving four decks, two “good” decks, 
C and D, resulting in an overall gain in the end (despite low-paying 
individual cards), and two “bad” decks, A and B, resulting in a greater 
loss than the “good” decks (despite higher-paying cards). Damásio and 
colleagues have shown that patients with VMPFC damage perform 
poorly compared to normal subjects. They explain this result with the 
hypothesis that while normal subjects make decisions to some extent 
relying on anticipatory somatic markers (SCRs), the former cannot rely 
on such help. It is not the case that these subjects cannot produce SCRs 
when punished or rewarded: rather, they simply fail to produce the 
anticipatory SCRs that experience triggers in normals.
  While these results provide corroborating evidence regarding 
patients with damage to the VMPFC, it is mainly the data obtained 
with normal subjects that are of interest to the theory of unconscious 
knowledge. In fact, it was found that before entering a period in which 
these subjects started to develop a hunch concerning what was going 
on in the IGT, they already produced higher anticipatory SCRs before 
selecting cards from the disadvantageous decks. Moreover, the 30% of 
normal participants who failed to reach a conceptual period (awareness 
of what was going on in the game) performed advantageously all the 
same. Damásio and colleagues actually implicitly invoked unconscious 
knowledge in these two cases, seeing the SCRs as unconscious biases 
guiding the decisions made by the subjects. Also of interest is the fact 
that they make a qualitative distinction based on the overt or covert 
processing of the somatic markers: if overt, they influence cognition at 
a conscious level; when covert, they contribute by biasing the cognitive 
process (e.g., Damásio, 1996, p. 1415). The contribution of the SMH to 
the field of unconscious cognition has been emphasized more recently 
(e.g., Bechara & Damásio, 2005). 
  If there is a controversial theory today, it is the SMH (for a review, 
see Dunn, Dlagleish, & Lawrence, 2006); however, many of the chal-
lenges it faces are of no interest to this study, as they do not directly 
regard the issue of unconscious knowledge. Nevertheless, there are also 
challenges touching on the issue of consciousness: For instance, Maia 
and McClelland (2004) play down the actual role of the unconscious 
processing of the somatic markers, claiming that the IGT actually pro-
motes conscious rather than unconscious mentation. As a response, 
Damásio and colleagues emphasize that the SMH does not disregard 
the  role  of  consciousness  in  decision  making,  seeing  unconscious 
processes as assisting rather than determining it (cf. Bechara, Damásio, 
Tranel, & Damásio, 2005, p. 159). It would be interesting to ally re-
search on the SMH with more explicitly learning-directed tasks.    
    
unconscious thought theory
It is not clear the extent to which unconscious thought theory (UTT) 
is a separate theory, as it shares many of its assumptions with what   
can be broadly called unconscious knowledge (cf. e.g., Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006), though it does not emphasize the cognitive aspect; 
that is, it does not go into the details of the unconscious processing 
of information, namely in decision making, its main focus. Rather, 
UTT merely tries to account for the existence of what it calls “the” 
unconscious in the empirically observed fact that people seem to make 
better decisions when they leave it to “the” unconscious to do the job. 
Although, unlike SMH, it is not so obviously a cognitive hypothesis, it 
is of interest to a general theory of unconscious knowledge, which, as 
seen, must per force include decision making. 
  The first and obvious problem with this “unconscious thought” 
is the extent to which it is simply inattention, given that most experi-
ments trying to analyse this process rely heavily on simply distracting 
the participating subjects, diverting their attention to tasks that de-
mand attention, thus hindering concentration on the task actually be-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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ing tested (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Maarten, Nordgren, & 
van Baaren, 2006). This, the proponents of the theory call “sleep on” the 
decision, “let the unconscious mull,” and “incubation” (Dijksterhuis, 
2004).
  The basic assumption – what UTT calls the capacity principle 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) – is that the limited capacity of “con-
scious thought” is not the best resource when making complex deci-
sions,19 whereas the virtually unlimited capacity of the unconscious to 
process information makes it the tool of choice in those cases. Other 
assumptions of the theory are the bottom-up-versus-top-down prin-
ciple, according to which the unconscious works bottom-up (whereas 
conscious thought works top-down); the rule principle, stating that 
unconscious thought gives rough estimates, as against the rule-like and 
precise  conscious  thought;  and  the  convergence-versus-divergence 
principle,  characterizing  the  unconscious  as  divergent,  thus  op-
posed to the convergence believed to characterize conscious thought 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006). 
  The main argument is that whereas complexity greatly interferes 
with conscious thought, thus often resulting in bad choices, the uncon-
scious is not affected by it (see Figure 4). The assumptions underlying 
this conclusion are in fact not far from some of those shared by other 
theories of unconscious knowledge: For instance, as seen above, re-
search in artificial grammars rests in large measure on the assumption 
that complex grammatical rules are more easily learned unconsciously. 
However, UTT does not share the fundamental assumptions of the 
other theories of unconscious cognition: that the stimuli are not con-
sciously perceived (cf. e.g., the double visual stream hypothesis), are 
not consciously – that is, strategically – learned (cf. the assumptions of 
research in artificial grammars), or are not consciously accessible (cf. 
research into implicit memory). UTT simply claims that consciously 
learned information of a complex kind, but in part or even largely ac-
cessible at any time during a decision making task, is better processed 
when attention is diverted from it.
Thus, it is certainly difficult to see in which way it might contribute 
to our comprehension of unconscious knowledge, in that the cognitive 
factors involved are not clear, but in this section, as in most of this text, 
we are interested in how unconsciously processed knowledge supports 
successful behaviour. Allowing for the fact that consciously learned 
and stored information may be processed wholly unconsciously and 
nevertheless result in optimal, or rational decisions,20 we may accept 
this as a cognitive process with distinctive properties; according to A. 
Dijksterhuis, this “incubation”21 results in “clearer, more polarized, and 
more integrated representations in memory” (Dijksterhuis, 2004, p. 
586; Dijksterhuis et al., 2009). This, the assumption that decision mak-
ing is better when one lets unconscious processes take care of the job, 
faces criticism on both the theoretical and methodological levels (e.g., 
Acker, 2008; González-Vallejo, Lassiter, Bellezza, & Lindberg, 2008). 
conclusIon
Despite much evidence in favour, the claim that there is a specific, 
qualitatively distinct unconscious kind of knowledge remains contro-
versial. Whether one likes – or admits – it or not, much of the con-
troversy surrounding this field of research aims to discredit it, not so 
much as being pseudo-scientific, but simply as being methodologically 
faulty and theoretically wrong. Perhaps, in the name of a sacrosanct 
rationalism that still equates reason and other “higher” cognitive fac-
ulties with consciousness, the objective of many – though obviously 
not all – critics seems to be the straightforward refutation of the hy-
pothesis that there is unconscious knowledge. The main issue is not 
prima facie one of demarcation between science and pseudo-science: 
Experiments are repeated with the objective of refuting positive find-
ings, and criticism targets both the assumptions and the methods of 
the diverse theories of unconscious perception and cognition. The 
falsification involved seems to aim at showing that “consciousness does 
it”, that is, the replacement of theories invoking unconscious processes 
by a theory of an all-encompassing consciousness; when consciousness 
does not easily account for the phenomenon, then favourable findings 
are attributed to methodological weaknesses (e.g., Dulany et al., 1984; 
Shanks & St. John, 1994). These – in particular the latter – challenges 
are, however, to be taken seriously. Hence, the need to distinguish 
clearly between measures of conscious and unconscious perceptual 
experience. This process led to the advocacy of indirect measures (e.g., 
Marcel, 1983a) and to the proposal to adopt subjective (vs. objective) 
measures of awareness (e.g., Merikle, 1992), which rely on what has 
been dubbed the subjective threshold (the point at which subjects do 
not know that they know that a stimulus was presented), and also on 
the ability attributed to humans of having higher order thoughts (being 
aware of their own mental states; e.g., Dienes, 2007). 
  If one sides with a definition of knowledge as the establishment 
of successful relations with the environment (James, 1904), then em-
pirical data in behavioural and (neuro)cognitive psychology suggests 
strongly that there is a qualitatively distinct kind of knowledge, ac-
quired, stored, and recalled in a wholly unconscious way. Concerning 
the acquisition of this kind of knowledge, research with artificial gram-
 
   
 
                                                                                                                     
   
 















the relation complexity – quality in conscious and unconscious de-
cision making. Adapted from “A theory of Unconscious thought” 
by A. dijksterhuis and l. F. nordgren, 2006, Perspectives on Psycho-
logical Science, 1, p. 103.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
http://www.ac-psych.org 2010 • volume 6 • 116-141 133
mars and with other paradigms has shown that highly complex systems 
of rules can be learned and thus correctly applied without improving 
explicit knowledge of the systems. In a different vein, but with the same 
objective in view, research into cognition in states of anaesthesia and, 
to a lesser degree, in coma and in sleep has secured some results that 
indicate the unconscious processing of material presented in those 
states in which consciousness is (more) safely ruled out. Studies on 
implicit memory with unimpaired subjects and subjects with impaired 
memory have provided evidence that there are specific ways, function-
ally and anatomically differentiated, of storing and recalling informa-
tion without awareness. The overall focus of research into unconscious 
knowledge is the “knowledgeable” behaviour of subjects in the absence 
of metaknowledge concerning their own epistemic states: Work in-
spired by the dual stream hypothesis in visual deficits, perhaps better 
than any other field, shows that individuals can behave successfully by 
relying only on unconscious mental states, such as unconscious beliefs 
and intentions. These studies corroborate one of the major tenets of 
unconscious cognition, to wit, that unconscious knowledge is solely 
procedural, remaining inaccessible to consciousness and verbalization. 
Although at first sight not primarily, or at all, concerned with issues 
of unconscious knowledge, the somatic marker hypothesis and what 
is known as unconscious thought theory might be seen as contribut-
ing to the assumption that one can decide, securing beneficial results, 
by resorting to unconscious forms of knowledge processing alone. 
The diverse theories involved share basic assumptions and have many 
methodological methods in common that call for a unification of the 
field of unconscious knowledge. This would undoubtedly strengthen 
the individual theories on this particular subject against the many 
challenges the hypothesis of an unconscious knowledge still faces con-
temporarily. Corroborating evidence from emerging and recently de-
veloping research in topics such as implicit learning in schizophrenia 
(e.g., Danion, Meulemans, Kauffmann-Muller, & Vermaat, 2001) and 
information processing during pre-natal development (e.g., Kisilevsky 
et al., 2004), while adding to the already staggering complexity of the 
discussion in relation to consciousness, promises to enrich the field of 
research in unconscious knowledge. 
Footnotes
1 This cognitive distinction is often paralleled with the epistemo-
logical dichotomy between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (e.g., 
Cohen & Squire, 1980). This is a dichotomy attributed to Ryle (1949), 
which  actually  faces  much  opposition  within  epistemology  (e.g., 
Stanley & Williamson, 2001), and which is not relevant to the view of 
knowledge adopted in this study. For instance, speaking a language as 
a native speaker, and applying this distinction, while being a kind of 
knowledge-how, it is necessarily a knowledge-that, too (this does not 
mean that the speaker has to have academic knowledge of their native 
language; see the case of young fluent speakers). In the case of such a 
complex competence as speaking a mother language (e.g., individuals 
with serious cognitive deficits can speak their native languages with 
remarkable accuracy), it is not at all clear where knowledge-how ends 
and knowledge-that begins, and vice-versa, which renders the distinc-
tion greatly uninformative for our ends. In other words, procedural 
knowledge is also knowledge of facts and rules, and declarative kinds 
of knowledge may comprise procedures. 
2 This often seems to be the case; for instance, Allen and Reber 
(1980) showed that two years after a 10-15 min exposure to an artificial 
grammar, subjects were significantly more likely to assign grammatical 
status to test items learned in an implicit mode: “While some blurring 
of structure knowledge comes with time, and subjects report that im-
mediate intuitive apprehension of grammaticality is somewhat harder 
to come by, knowledge gained in the implicit mode is persistent in both 
form and quality” (Allen & Reber, 1980, p. 184). Short-lived forms 
of  unconscious  knowledge  (e.g.,  motor  representations)  have  been 
reported, but their short duration might be explained by the interfer-
ence or contamination by subsequent conscious representations (e.g., 
Rossetti, 1998). This orchestration with conscious forms of knowledge 
might also explain instances in which unconscious knowledge appears 
less inflexible or less rigid (Kiefer, 2007; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 
2003; see Feature 4 in this section).
3 That is, they speak the language to which they were exposed cor-
rectly, regardless of the correctness of that language in normative terms.
4  Or homologous structures, like the avian Wulst; for this homol-
ogy and its relation to consciousness, see Butler and Cotterill (2006).
5  Briefly, in his first topographical elaboration of the psychic ap-
paratus (Freud, 1900/1958, 1915/1968), the unconscious is seen as the 
“place” or “system” where representatives of instinctual needs strive in 
order to find motor expression (satisfaction) by following somehow 
predictable processes (the primary process: condensation and displace-
ment). This scenario, ruled by the pleasure principle, is greatly compli-
cated in the second elaboration of the psychic apparatus. Here , beyond 
the  pleasure  principle  (cf.  Freud,  1920/1961),  unconscious  psychic 
processes  (no longer confined to a “location” but  seen as structural: 
the id can be said to be a deep structure, whereas the ego is a surface 
structure, in contact with reality; cf. Freud, 1923/1961) are ruled by the 
compulsion to repeat that can “blindly” seek the very destruction of the 
organism (the death drive; see Freud, 1920/1961).
6  For instance, recent findings suggest that unconscious processing 
might actually be subject to some top-down control (e.g., Ansorge & 
Neumann, 2005; Kiefer, 2007).
7  See Adams (1957) for an exhaustive review of research on “behav-
iour without awareness” from the late 1800s to the 1950s.
8  See Miller (1939, pp. 562-565) for a brief account of early experi-
mental studies in subliminal perception.
9  Although Fechner already talked of unconscious sensations, his 
attempt to translate psychological findings and hypotheses into the 
language of mathematics made this conception rather unintelligible: 
He actually claimed that below the absolute threshold the subject “per-
ceived less than nothing” (cf. Fechner, 1860).
10 A common bias concerning unconscious processing is that it is 
reduced to mere automatisms; cases such as blindsight show that this 
is unlikely to be the case, and that what goes on is actually the forma-
tion of unconscious complex, higher mental states, such as beliefs and 
intentions (e.g., Vakalopoulos, 2005, p. 1185).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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11  Other experimental paradigms not directly appealing to the dual 
visual stream hypothesis that corroborate the hypothesis of an un-
conscious discrimination are, for instance, the different ways patients 
scan unfamiliar and familiar faces (Rizzo, Hurtig, & Damásio, 1987) 
and their shorter reaction times in matching familiar faces (de Haan, 
Young, & Newcombe, 1987).
12  This is an important specification, as the umbrella terms hemiag-
nosia,  hemineglect,  hemispatial  neglect,  etc.  include  dysfunctions  in 
other sensory modalities.
13  In a “classical” auditory version (e.g., MacKay, 1973), at the same 
time that the subject shadows (attends to and repeats aloud) a sentence 
like They stood by the bank presented to one ear, the word water (or 
money) is presented to the other ear.
14 Also of import was the conclusion suggested by the results that 
Stroop-type effects do not occur only at the stage of response.
15 For example, as managers of a sugar production factory, reach-
ing and maintaining a specified level of sugar output, by varying the 
number of working employees.
16 There are three main theoretical accounts of memory: the already 
known multiple memory system, and the activation and processing ac-
counts (e.g., Schacter, 1987, p. 511).
17 Well illustrated by states of somnambulism, commonly occurring 
during  a deep sleep state (Stages 3 and 4) in which subjects answer appro-
priately  to  sensor y   input   (e.g., Jacobson, Kales, Lehmann, & Zweizig, 1965).
18 This against the claims of many Soviet and East European studies 
in the 1960s; however, it might be the case that their results were due to 
different methodological approaches, namely the fact that the material 
to be learned was presented before sleep onset (cf. Aarons, 1976).
19 These being decisions with multiple factors to them.
20 This is one factor that greatly weakens UTT, as the question of 
normativity and rationality is far from uncontroversial (e.g., Shafir & 
LeBoeuf, 2002).
21 It is important to remark that the theoretically vague “incuba-
tion” is not usually seen as involving unconscious thought processes 
(e.g., Seabrook & Dienes, 2003).
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